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COMMERCIAL LAW-UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE-SECURITY INTERESTS IN LIVESTOCK*
Banks have traditionally loaned money to ranchers in return for
a promissory note and a consensual lien in livestock held by the
rancher. The problems involved in using livestock as collateral are
numerous, but central among them is the problem of keeping account
of the animals. A bank cannot keep livestock within its vault, as is
the practice when stocks or bonds are used as collateral for a loan.
Neither has any means been devised of marking or separating the
livestock so it can be clearly determined that the animals are subject
to a possessory interest held by the bank. Since the collateral cannot
be held by the lender, the security agreement typically includes a
promise by the borrower assuring that the livestock will not be sold
or transferred without the written consent of the secured party. The
security interest in the collateral is perfected by filing with the county
clerk in the county of the debtor's residence. In this manner, constructive notice that the livestock is subject to a mortgage is given
within the county.
In Clovis National Bank v. Harold Thomas d/b/a Clovis Cattle
Commission Company', the bank loaned money to a rancher who in
turn gave the bank a promissory note and a security interest in cattle.
The security interest was perfected by proper recording in two New
Mexico counties.2 By the terms of the security agreement, the
rancher promised not to sell or transfer the cattle without the permission of the bank. The rancher consigned these cattle to the
defendant for sale at public auction, although the bank had no
knowledge of the consignment and had not given express consent to
the sales. The auctioneer sold the cattle and remitted the proceeds
to the rancher, but the rancher failed to pay off the bank loan which
the cattle had secured.
The bank brought this action against the auctioneer for conversion. The auctioneer alleged reliance on a prior course of dealing
between the bank and the rancher as establishing the ineffectiveness
of the rancher's agreement not to sell the cattle without the bank's
consent. The rancher had previously sold cattle covered by a
similar security agreement without obtaining the bank's permission
* Clovis National Bank v. Harold Thomas d/b/a Clovis Cattle Commission Co.,
77 N.M. 554, 425 P.2d 726 (1967).
1. 77 N.M. 554, 425 P.2d 726 (1967).
2. Id. at 557, 425 P.2d at 728.
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to do so. On that occasion he had voluntarily taken the proceeds of
the sale to the bank as payment on a note which they secured. The
tender had been under conditions such that the bank knew an
unpermitted sale of the collateral had been made, but the bank received the payment without quarreling about the sale.8
The trial court held that the bank had consented to and acquiesced in the sales, and was estopped from recovery because of its
conduct. On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court held,
Affirmed; the bank, by prior conduct, waived its right to require its
authorization for sale or other disposition of the cattle. The court
based its decision, not on estoppel, but only on consent and waiver."
The court stated that although the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code applied to this case, the pre-code law result still
prevails.6
This Comment will demonstrate that application of the Uniform
Commercial Code0 should lead to a different result. The language of
section 9-102 of the Code clearly provides that the Code is applicable to the transaction in the Thomas case. 7 The Code applies to
any transaction which is intended to create a security interest in
goods. Section 9-109 classifies farm products, including livestock,
as goods.8
3. Id. at 559, 425 P.2d at 729. There was other testimony that the bank made a
practice of allowing debtors to sell livestock collateral without obtaining prior
permission.
4. Id. at 560, 425 P.2d at 730. It is difficult to reconcile the application of the
doctrine of estoppel. There was no fault or fraud on the part of the bank. Its prior
acquiescence to the sale of collateral was merely passive. Further, there was no
relationship whatsoever between the bank and defendant. The defendant did not rely
on the conduct of the bank. See Rank v. (Krug) United States, 142 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.
Cal. 1956).
5. See note 1 supra at 562, 425 P.2d at 731.
6. The 1958 version of the Uniform Commercial Code was made law in New
Mexico effective in 1961. The state legislature made a few changes from the official
text. None of these changes creates substantial differences from the present official
text with respect to this problem. The analysis of this comment is substantially the
same under the New Mexico Commercial Code with its variations and under the
present official text of the Code. New Mexico, in contrast to some states, has not
enacted the comments to the official text as law. However, the draftsmen of the Code
supplemented the text with comments to safeguard against misconstruing of the text
and an examination of these comments seems appropriate to clarify the questions
involved here.
7. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-9-102 (1) (a) (Repl. 1962). The Code applies "to any
transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in
personal property or fixtures, including goods, documents, instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper, accounts, or contract rights.
2"
8. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-9-109 (Repl. 1962).
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Under the provisions of the Code, a security interest is not
enforceable against the debtor or third parties unless the debtor
has signed a security agreement which contains a description of
the collateral, or the collateral is in the possession of the secured
party.9 Section 9-110 indicates that a description of collateral is
sufficient, whether or not it is specific, if it reasonably identifies what
is described." In Thomas, the security agreement signed by the
rancher contained a description of the brand on the cattle and indicated the kind and number of the cattle covered by the agreement.
The validity of the security agreement signed by the rancher was
unquestioned.
Section 9-401 of the Code provides for proper filing in order to
perfect a security interest. 1 New Mexico requires that a security
interest, such as the one in Thomas, be filed in the office of the
county clerk in the county of the debtor's residence. This requirement was met by the bank.12 The security agreement gave two locations where the cattle would be kept, one of which was in the county
of the debtor's residence. The agreement was filed in the county seat
of both locations.
In Thomas, the security agreement prohibited transfers without
the consent of the secured party. Did the bank consent to the sales?
There was no express consent or waiver. If consent or waiver was
implied, then it must have been implied from the course of dealing.
Even if the course of dealing did imply consent or waiver, that
course of dealing was inconsistent with the terms of the written
agreement. The Code provides a solution when factors such as
these conflict. Section 1-205 states:
The express terms of an agreement and an applicable course of
dealing or usage of trade shall be construed wherever reasonable as
consistent with each other; but when such construction is unreasonable express terms control both course of dealing and usage of
trade.'
This section seems to be in direct disagreement with the holding of
the court in Thomas. It is not reasonable to construe the conduct of
9. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-9-203 (Repl. 1962). The official comment to this section
states: "The only requirements for the enforceability of non-possessory security
interests in cases not involving land are (a) a writing; (b) the debtor's signature; and
(c) a description of the collateral or kinds of collateral."
10. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-9-110 (Repl. 1962).
11. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-9-401 (Repl. 1962).
12. See note 1 rupra at 557, 425 P.2d at 728.
13. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-1-205 (4) (Repl. 1962).
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the parties as being consistent with the written agreement. However, even if an inconsistent course of dealing did imply consent the
court's result is not justified. The Code expressly provides that the
terms of the written agreement are controlling.
Pre-Code case law on facts like these holds that express terms of
a contract prevail over a course of dealing. In Thomas, the court
found that a course of dealing was established by previous transactions in which the rancher sold cattle without obtaining the consent
4
of the bank and the bank accepted the proceeds without complaint.1
However, a California district court has stated that in order to be
binding, a custom or usage must be definite, uniform and well known,
established by clear and satisfactory evidence, shown to be long
established, reasonable, and accepted by acquiescence. 1 5 It is doubtful that these requirements fit the relationship between the bank and
the rancher in Thomas. In Security State Bank v. Clovis Mill and
Elevator Company 6, The Supreme Court held that custom will not
prevail over a statute or the terms of a contract in conflict with the
custom. In another case the New Mexico Supreme Court held that
proof of a custom is not allowable to vary the terms of a contract. 17
These cases, as well as the Code itself, seem to indicate that if there
is a signed agreement between the parties and a course of dealing
inconsistent with that agreement, the terms of the agreement prevail.
The protection to which the bank was entitled and which it
should have expected is made evident by the Code. Section 9-201,
dealing with the general validity of a security agreement, states:
"Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security agreement is
effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors.'. 8 The official comment to this section emphasizes that a security agreement is effective
against third parties.' 9 This section seems to point out that the
defendant, having accepted the collateral as a consignee, cannot
escape liability merely because he was not a party to the agreement.
Section 9-303 emphasizes the rule that a security interest once
perfected, remains perfected. 20 Comment 1 to this section points
14-. See note 1 rupra at 559, 425 P.2d at 729.
15. Rosenberg Brothers & Company v. United States Shipping Board, 7 F.2d 893

(D.C. Cal. 1925).
16. 41 N.M. 341, 345, 68 P.2d 918 (1937).
17. Romero v. Romero, 29 N.M. 667, 670, 226 P. 652 (1924).

18. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-9-201 (Repl. 1962).
19. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-201, Comment.
20. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-9-303 (2) (Repl. 1962).

JANUARY 1968"1

COMMENTS

out that the secured party is protected against transferees of the
debtor. 2 It seems clear that one purpose of the Code is to prevent
a result such as occured in Thomas. There are strict requirements
involved in establishing a security interest in collateral, but once
these requirements have been met, the secured party should be
protected against losing that interest through circumstances over
which he has no control.
Section 1-107 of the Code provides for the waiver of any claim
or right arising out of an alleged breach. 22 It requires that such a
waiver be in writing. It is doubtful whether this section applies to
the Thomas case because it appears that a waiver can be exercised
only where a breach has already occurred. This is the only section
that mentions waiver in regard to secured transactions. However,
the Comment to this section states that the effectiveness of waiver
and estoppel is recognized.2 3
Section 1-103 provides for the application of supplementary
principles of law. 24 This section states that, unless they are displaced by the particular provisions of the Code, the principles of
law and equity, such as estoppel and waiver, supplement the Code.
It was by the authority of this Code section that the court found
that the bank had waived its rights in the cattle. The bank should
have been completely protected by the provisions of the Code, but
even if supplementary principles of law are considered, it still must
be established that the bank consented to the sale of the cattle and
waived its right. The court in Thomas stated that waiver is the
"intentional abandonment or relinquishment of a known right. ' 25
In the very case the court cites 20 , (an insurance case dealing with
agent-principal relationship), the court emphasized the importance
of establishing the intent of the party to waive its right. In Thomas,
there was no evidence to indicate that the bank intended to waive its
right; there was merely little opportunity for it to exercise the right.
Another case cited by the court 27 involved collection from an insurance company. There the holding was based on the interrelationship of the doctrines of waiver and estoppel. 28 It stated that estoppel
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Uniform Commercial Code § 9-303, Comment 1.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-1-107 (Repl. 1962).
Uniform Commercial Code § 1-107, Comment.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-1-103 (Repl. 1962).
See note 1 supra at 560, 425 P.2d at 730.
Smith v. New York Life Insurance Co., 26 N.M. 408, 193 P. 67 (1920).
Miller v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 52 N.M. 68, 191 P.2d 993 (1948).
See note 4 supra.
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precludes assertion of a right, which might otherwise have existed,
because of acts or conduct relied and acted upon by another to his
detriment and prejudice. The auctioneer in Thomas could not
reasonably rely on the bank's conduct as constituting an intentional
relinquishment of a known right.
A Pennsylvania district court case has stated that a waiver of a
contractual right will not be presumed or implied contrary to the
intention of the party whose rights would be injuriously affected
thereby, unless by his conduct the opposite party has been misled,
to his prejudice, into the honest belief that such waiver was intended
or consented to. 29 The rancher in Thomas was clearly not misled
to his prejudice. It is doubtful if there was a waiver of the bank's
rights even outside the provisions of the Code.
Another Code section that should be examined in relation to the
Thomas case is section 9-306.80 It provides that a security interest
in collateral continues in any identifiable proceeds after the sale or
exchange of that collateral. This section is pointed directly at the
factual situation in Thomas. The draftsmen of the Code stated in
the Comment to this section that: ". . . since the transferee takes
subject to the security interest, the secured party may repossess the
collateral from him or in an appropriate case maintain an action
for conversion."'" Is Thomas an appropriate case for this type of
action? It appears from the facts of the case and the language of the
Code that it is. The section that outlines the purposes of the Code
seems particularly applicable. 2 It provides that the code is to be
"liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes
and policies." These purposes and policies are:
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
3
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
It is essential that the courts recognize that security agreements in
livestock transactions are as binding as other commercial transactions.8 4 A purchaser of real estate is charged with notice of the
29. In re Zimmerman, 35 F. Supp. 13 (E.D.Pa. 1940).
30. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-9-306 (Repl. 1962).
31. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-306, Comment 3.
32. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-1-102 (Repl. 1962).
33. N.M. Stat. Ann. § SOA-1-102(2) (Repl. 1962).
34. See Bunn, Financing Farmers, 1954 Wis. L. Rev. 353, 360 (1954).
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real property records. An auctioneer, as in Thomas, or a person
buying livestock directly from the owner should be charged with the
duty to search the records for the presence of a security agreement
covering the livestock. A search of the records would put the
auctioneer on notice to question the bank about the provisions of
the security agreement. This would protect the secured party by
eliminating the possibility of reliance on any course of performance
between the bank and the debtor which is inconsistent with the terms
of the security agreement. At the same time it does not seem that
having to search the record on all cattle to be sold would place too
great a burden on an auctioneer. The burden on potential buyers
at the auction to search the record on all the cattle to be sold is
unreasonable.
A liberal construction of the Code would bring about the application of these procedures to livestock transactions. The New Mexico
Supreme Court in Strevell-PatersonFinance Company v. May" has
emphasized that in the area of secured transactions the Code is to
be construed liberally, and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies. The code hints at the peculiar problems of
secured transactions in livestock when it states in section 9-307
(1)36 that:

A buyer in ordinary course of business other than a person buying
farm products from a person engaged in farming operations takes
free of a security interest created by his seller even though the security
interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its
existence.
One purpose of the Code is to permit the continued expansion of
commercial practices.3 7 The decision in the Thomas case is likely
to restrict loans on livestock. The usefulness of providing livestock
as collateral is now under question.
THOMAS H. EMMERSON

35. 77 N.M. 331, 442 P.2d 366 (1967).
36. N.M. Stat. Ann § 50A-9-307 (Repl. 1962).
37. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50A-1-102 (Repl. 1962).

